THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

VALIDATION OF DEFECTIVELY EXECUTED WILLS BY HOLOGRAPHIC TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENT: INTEGRATION AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
The integration of writings intended by the testator to be his last will and the
incorporation by reference of writings lacking testamentary effect into a valid
testamentary instrument are generally regarded as distinct doctrines, each limited to a separate area of application.1 Doubt as to the efficacy of any such distinction has been raised by the recent case of Johnson v. Johnson,2 to which both
theories appear to apply simultaneously, leading to divergent results.'
In Johnson v. Johnson, a typewritten paper purporting to dispose of testator's estate was invalid as a will for lack of signature and attestation. On the
same paper, in the handwriting of the testator, followed: "To my brother James
I give ten dollars only This will shall be complete unless hereafter altered
changed or rewritten". 4 The handwriting was dated and signed. There was testimony to the effect that decedent had shown this paper to another, calling it
his will, and that at such time the paper contained only the typewriting. Later,
decedent said he had changed his will by codicil. In a five to three decision, the
court held the paper was to be admitted to probate in its entirety. "[T]he valid
holographic codicil [handwriting] incorporated the prior will [typewriting] by
reference and republished and validated the prior will.. .

."5 In

dissent it was

1

Atkinson, Wills § 80 (2d ed., 1953); Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration and
Nontestamentary Act, 25 Cal. L. Rev. 879, 888 (1925); Integration and Incorporation by
Reference, 4 Baylor L. Rev. 211,- 214 (1952).
2 Okla., 279 P. 2d 928 (1954), noted in 30 N.Y.U.1. Rev. 1456 (1955); 8 Vand. L. Rev. 924
(1955); 24 J. Bar A. Kan. 193 (1955); 44 Ky. L.J. 130 (1955).
a Professor Mechem, in Integration of Holographic Wills,, 12 N.C.L. Rev. 213, 221 (1934),
has similarly suggested integration and incorporation may apply to the same facts and lead
to contrary results, citing as an example Gibson v. Gibson, 28 Grat. (Va.) 44 (1877). There,
the paper sought to be probated began in writing that was not that of the testatrix, said writing being invalid as a will for lack of attestation. In testatrix's handwriting followed: "As
Margaret is dead, I give her share to my niece Lizzie Leigh Gibson. [Signed] E. S. Holmes.
December 31st, 1871." Held: Neither portion, either singly or in combination, is admissible
to probate. This case is often cited as authority for refusing to allow holographic instruments to
incorporate non-holographic material. See, e.g., Malone, Incorporation, by Reference, of an
Extrinsic Document into a Holographic Will, 16 Va. L. Rev. 571, 578-580 (1930).
4Okla., 279 P. 2d 928, 933 (1954).
6Ibid., at932. It is unclear whether the majority proceeded on the theory of incorporation
by reference or on the theory of republication by codicil. See 2 Page on Wills § 552 (1941),
citing In re Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907) and Harvy v. Chouteau, 14 Mo.
587 (1851), as examples of republication by codicil and 1 Page on Wills § 249 (1941), where the
same cases are cited as examples of incorporation by reference. Nevertheless, the weight of
authority would distinguish these doctrines. Incorporation by reference is applicable when
the instrument sought to be validated has never had testamentary effect. Republication by
codicil applies only where the instrument sought to be validated has or had testamentary life.
Evans, Testamentary Republication, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 71, 72, 73 (1926). Consult also Ritchie,
Alford and Effland. Cases and Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts-183 (1955); Atkin-
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urged that "the typewritten part is not a will and the handwritten part is not a
codicil. The handwritten part is only a continuation of the typewritten part.
. .fl In other words, the paper is one integrated whole and as such is not admissible to probate since it is neither attested nor "entirely written, dated and
'7
signed by the hand of the testator himself."
I
The requisites for the application of incorporation by reference may be simply
stated. There must be a valid testamentary instrument' containing a reasonably
definite reference to a writing9 as already existing, in such a way as to evidence
an intention to incorporate that writing. Further, the writing must have been in
existence before the execution of the incorporating instrument, and it must be
shown that it corresponds with the description in that instrument. The presence
son, Wills § 90 (2d ed., 1953); Mitchell, Present State of Testamentary Republication, 70 L.Q.
Rev. 353,355 (1954); Samuels, Incorporation by Reference in New York Wills, 19 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 270, 273 (1942); Chaplin, Incorporation by Reference, 2 Col. L. Rev. 148 (1902). Cf.
Mechem, Integration of Holographic Wills, 12 N.C. L. Rev. 213, 230 (1934). But see Hahn,
Can a Valid Codicil Republish an Imperfectly Executed Will?, 17 J. Bar. A.D.C. 372, 378
et seq. (1950).
No case has been found expressly dealing with the distinction between incorporation and
republication. Representative cases supporting by implication the distinction herein expressed:
Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moo. P.C. 427 (1858) (leading English case); Simon v. Grayson, 15
Cal. 2d 531, 102 P. 2d 1081 (1940); Eschmann v. Cawi, 357 Ill. 379, 192 N.E. 226 (1934);
In re Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907); Skinner v. American Bible Society, 92
Wis. 209, 65 N.W. 1037 (1896); cf. Succession of Ledet, 170 La. 449, 128 So. 273 (1930); see
Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91 (1881) (leading American case). Contra:
Beall v. Cunningham, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 390 (1843); Stover v. Kendall, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 557
(1860). Some courts make no distinction. E.g., Taft v. Steams, 234 Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570
(1920). Others appear to recognize the validation of defective wills by subsequent codicil as an
independent doctrine. Lovern v. Eaton, 80 N.H. 62, 113 Atl. 206 (1921); In re Kelly's Estate,
236 Pa. 34, 84 At. 593 (1912). Cf. Hinson v. Hinson, - Tex. -, 280 S.W. 2d 731 (1955);
Hamlet v. Hamlet, 183 Va. 453, 32 S.E. 2d 729 (1945).
In accord with what is felt to be the weight of authority, incorporation by reference will
be used herein as the basis, if any, for the validation of defectively executed testamentary
instruments which have never had testamentary life,
6 Okla., 279 P. 2d 928, 936 (1954). The dissent also urged that a holographic codicil should
not be allowed to validate a defectively executed non-holographic will, a position discussed in
the text infra. (Note: By non-holograph is meant any writing not in the hand of the testator.
Thus, the holographic will of one person would be non-holographic as concerns another. For
the meaning of holograph as is used herein see note 7 infra.)
7 Okla. Stat. (1951) Title 84, § 54. By statute, 19 states, in addition to the formal attested
will, recognize the holographic will either as a distinct type of will or as a special type of will
not requiring attestation. The requirements of these statutes are similar to those of Oklahoma
stated in the text. Rheinstein, The Law of Decedents' Estates 204, 205 (2d ed., 1955); Atkinson, Wills § 75 (2d ed., 1953); Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills, 14 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 25
(1928).
S This requirement is discussed in the text infra and is of paramount importance in regard
to the discussion that follows.

'Properly, the writing should never have had testamentary effect as the will of the party in
question. See authorities cited in note 5 supra.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

of these elements will result in the admission to probate of the writing to which
the reference is made. 10
In the Johnson case, the handwriting alone meets the requirements set out for
holographic wills by the Oklahoma statutes." The reference to "this will" may
be taken to mean this ineffective will-that is,.the typewriting.12 Since this reference was made in the present tense, it may be regarded as to a writing then in
existence. It appears from testimony that the typewriting was in existence before the handwriting. Oral evidence also identifies the typewriting as the "will"
in question. 3 Thus it would appear that the admission to probate of the paper
left by the testator in the Johnson case isa result both justified and required by
the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
Case law concerning the validation of defectively executed non-holographic
wills by subsequent valid .holographic codicil is generally considered to be in
conflict1 -depending on whether or not the incorporated material is regarded as
actually becoming a-physical part of the incorporating instrument. 5 Some cases
allow validation. InIn re Plumel'sEstate,6 an unattested instrument nbt entirely
in the testator's hand.was held to be validated through incorporation by reference into a holographic writing designated "'Codicil'" and found on the back
of the invalid instrument. In support of its decision, the court cited In re Soher's
Estate,17 wherein it is said:
Now, if an attested will can refer to a document which is not-attested, we can see
no good reason why an oIographic will may not refer to a document which is not in
the handwriting of the testator. The only difference between an olographic and
attested will is-in the form of execution.... [W]hatever may be done in or by the one,
may be done in or by the other.18
10Consult Atkinson, Wills § 80 (2ded., 1953), wherein the cases are collected and reviewed;
Dobie, Testamentary Incorporation by Reference, 3 Va. L. Rev. 583 (1916). The writers are
collected in Ritchie, Alford and Effland, op. cit. supra note 5, at page 181 n. 7.
1 See authoriiies cited in note 7 supra.

12Contrast

the view stated in note 50 infra. The fact that the handwriting is on the same

page as the typewriting may of itself be sufficient reference. Cf.In re Plumel's Estate, 151
Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907)_ It at leat indicates which will "this will" contemplates.
" See note 12 supra.
'4Mechem, Integration of Holographic Wills, 1.2 N.C: L. Rev. 213, 221 (1934); Malone,
Incorporation, by Reference, of an Extrinsic Document into a Holographic Will, 16 Va. L. Rev,
571, 572 (1930); Incorporation by Referepce, 16 Tenn. L. Rev. 741, 743 (1941). "The cases
though few in number are hopelessly in con~flict'and no attempt will be made to reconcile
them." Ibid., at 742.
5
1f
I thle incorporated zion-holographic material is regarded as becoming a physical part of
the incorporating holograph,,itis clear thattincorporation will not result in validation because
the holographic character of the incorporating instrument is destroyed. Compare Hewes v.
Hewes, 110 Miss. 826,71 So. 4 (1916), with In re Soher's Eptate, 78 Cal. 477,21 Pdc. 8 (1889).
16151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907).
1 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac..8 (1889),

'lbid,, at 4a0-481, 9 Accord Rogers v. Agricolal ,17.6 Ark. 287, 3 S.W. 2d 26 (1928)
(where a holographic codicil to an imperfectly attested typewritten will was held to validate
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The recent case of Hinson v. Hinson' 9is illustrative of cases taking the opposite view. In issue was an improperly attested typewritten will and a subsequent
paper dated, signed and entirely in the hand of the testator, beginning" 'Supple.
mentiry to my Last Will, it still stands as is.' "20
Even if such instrument [typewriting] is regarded as having been incorporated in
or republished by the later handwritten memorandum and the two documents are
considered together, we are still confronted with -thefact that the'instrument offered
for probate is not wholly in the handwriting of the'decedent and is not attested as required by statute. It is our conclusion, therefore, that under the clear provision of2 our
statute the two instruments involved in this case cannot be admitted to probate.
Nor was the handwriting alone admitted to probate, although it was executed in
accordance with the wills statute, because it lacked any "testamentary intent."
Scott v. Gastright2 presents a similar situation. Testatrix left a typewritten
will unsigned and unattested-subsequent to which she had written, signed and
dated in her own hand on the back of an envelope, "'The will I dictated to
L. Schear Att'y, but did not sign is my last will and as I wish it.' "23 The court,
,following Sharp v. Wallace,24 -refused probate to the instruments, viewing the
effect of the asserted incorporation as merging the writings together, thereby
destroying the holographic character of the later writing. Again the handwriting
alone, although properly executed, was not admitted to probate because it
"[made] no disposition, of any property. 25
All of the cases denying incorporation present one significant feature, which
that will); In re Dobrzensky's Estate, 105 Cal. Alp. 2d 134, 232 P. 2d 886 (1951); see In re
Smith's-Estate, 31 Cal. 2d 563, 191 P. 2d 413 (1948).
The incorporation of the will of another by holographic instrument has also been allowed.
Estate of Martin, 31 Cal. App. 2d 501, 88 P. 2d 234 (1939). A holographic instrument may revoke part of a valid non-holographic will, In re Atkinson's Estate, 110 Cal. App. 499, 294 Pac.
425 (1930), and republish the remaining portions. In re Soher's Estate, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8
(1889). A non-holographic will that has been revoked by operation of law may be revived'or
republished by a holographic instrument. Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S.E. 873 (1922).
And see In re Thompson's Will, 196 N.C. 271, 145 S.E. 393 (1928), possibly supporting the incorporation of non-testamentary material not in testator's hand into a holographic instrument.
9 - Tex. -,'280 S.W. 2d 731 (1955).
22305 Ky. 340, 204 S.W. 2d 367 (1947).
2

0Ibid., at-, 733.

21

Ibid., at-,

736.

2

3

Ibid., at 341, 367.

24 83

Ky. 584 (1886).

- 305 Ky. 340, 341, 204 S.W. 2d 367 (1947). Other cases purporting to deny the incorporation of non-holographic material into holographic are Gibson v. Gibson discussed in note 3
supra and Sharp v. Wallace discussed in note 30 infra. Similarly, the incorporation of the will-of
another into a holographic instrument has been refused. Hewes v. Hewes, 110 Miss. 826, 71
So. 4 (1916). The incorporation of a deed into a properly executed holograph (which by itself
was not admissible to probate) has also been refused. In re Watt's Estate, 117 Mont. 505, 160
P. 2d 492 (1945). See also Howell v. Moore, 14 Tenn. App. 594, 631 (1930). Louisiana refuses to
recognize the general doctrine of incorporation by reference of defective wills, Succession of
Ledet, 170 La. 449, 128 So. 273 (1930), and therefore will refuse to allow a holograph to validate a defective non-holographic will, See dissent in Girven v. Miller, 219 La. 252, 52 So. 2d
843 (1951), noted in 26 Tulane L. Rev. 115 (1951).
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suggests a possible mode of reconciliation. None of them admitted the incorporating holograph to probate by itself, it being felt that the holograph lacked
testamentary intent, 26 was too indefinite27 or failed to make any testamentary
disposition.2 If it be assumed that the doctrine of incorporation by reference
requires for its application not only a properly executed incorporating instrument,2 9 but one that is also capable of independent probate, these cases may be
viewed on their facts as not presenting proper situations for incorporation by
reference.31 There is surprising lack of authority on this point.
Support for this view may be found in the following quotation:
If a will may incorporate other writings and may republish and revive prior wills, it
may well be held that it is because it is a valid will, regardless of whether it is holographic or attested, that it has all these effects. [Emphasis supplied.]"'
More particularly, it is clear that the incorporating instrument must itself be
capable of independent probate in so far as it must evidence testamentary intent, if the material to be incorporated is non-testamentary in character and
merely explanatory in its nature. The more difficult question is presented by
In re Anthony's Estate.32 It was there argued that a defectively dated holographic
instrument testamentary in character was validated through incorporation by
reference into a later holographic instrument which was properly signed and
dated but lacked any testamentary intent.
The first question suggested is as to whether the [later holograph] in itself is
testamentary in character, and whether it discloses on its face any intimation or
26 Hinson v. Hinson, discussed in text at note 19 supra.
27 Gibson v. Gibson, note 3 supra. Indefiniteness as a ground for refusing probate is criticized by Malone, Incorporation, by Reference, of an Extrinsic Document into a Holographic
Will, 16 Va. L. Rev. 571, 579-580 (1930).
28 Scott v. Gastright, discussed in text at note 22 supra. The absence of disposition of
property more properly may be taken to mean that the incorporating holograph lacked any
animus festandi, since it is clear that an instrument merely appointing executors may be admitted to probate. Reeves v. Duke, 192 Okla. 519, 137 P. 2d 897 (1943); Manship v. Stewart,
181 Ind. 299, 104 N.E. 505 (1914).
21 It is clear that the incorporating instrument must at least be executed according to the
formalities of the local wills statute. Cf. Leech's Estate, 236 Pa. 57; 84 Atl. 594 (1912); Notes v.
Doyle, 32 App. D.C. 413 (1909); Vestry v. Bostwick, 8 App. D.C. 452 (1896); Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 4 Desauss. Eq. (S.C.) 305 (1812). Similarly, the testator must have been competent
at the time of the execution of the incorporating instrument. Cf. Appeal of Rogers, 126 Me.
267, 138 Atl. 59 (1927); In re Will of Charolette Murray, 20 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 305 (1917).
10Sharp v. Wallace, 83 Ky. 584 (1886), is the only apparent exception to this statement
of all the cases involving validation of defectively executed wills, since it does not appear that
there were any grounds in that case for refusing to admit the holograph other than the fact it
was viewed as merged with the invalid will.
11Costigan, 5 Cases on the Law of Property-Wills, Descent and Administration 267 note
(2d ed., 1929). Consult also Ritchie, Alford and Effland, Cases and Materials on Decedents'
Estates and Trusts 181 (1955); Samuels, Incorporation by Reference in New York Wills, 19
N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 270, 273 (1942).
3221 Cal. App. 157, 131 Pac. 96 (1913).
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intention on the part of the deceased to constitute it his last will; and finally, if it can
be said to possess either of these characteristics to a satisfactory or convincing extent,
then is there such a reference. ... 3
Since the incorporating holograph was found to lack testamentary intent, it was
held that the asserted incorporation was properly refused."
It is clear that although a writing is executed in accordance with the local
wills statute, it is nonetheless inadmissible to probate if it lacks testamentary
intent.'- Such an instrument, as in In re Anthony's Estate, would also appear to
be incapable of validating another instrument on the theory of incorporation by
reference. The alternative to this rule would only require that the incorporating instrument be properly executed,"7 unless the general doctrine of incorporation by reference be denied. Such a view leads to what would appear to be
theoretically undesirable results. It would allow probate of a will and codicil
together, neither of which could be probated alone.38 Such a result is possible
under the integration theory, "9 but only upon conditions not necessarily met by
40
the tests for the application of incorporation by reference.
Statutes prescribing formalities of execution of testamentary instruments are
not only designed to lessen the possibility of fraud and forgery but also "to
Ibid., at 160, 98.
Alternatively, it was held that even assuming the incorporating holograph displayed
the necessary testamentary intent, there was insufficient reference to the earlier writing.
13In regard to holographic instruments see Atkinson, Wills § 47 (2d ed., 1953). An exception to this rule would be integrated papers (although their combination is subject to the
requirements set out in text). In re Estate of Skerret, 67 Cal. 585, 8 Pac. 181 (1885). "Neither
the copy of the deed nor the letter, taken by itself, constitutes a will; the one is not testamentary in its character, the other has no date; but taking them together as the deceased left them,
forming one document, it is complete." Ibid., at 588, 183. Papers validated by incorporation
are another exception. Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91 (1881).
6
In re Sciutti's Estate, 371 Pa. 536, 92 A. 2d 188 (1952); Ahlborn v. Peters, 37 Cal. App.
2d 688, 100 P. 2d 542 (1940) ("A non-testamentary document cannot incorporate an incomplete writing containing only some of the essentials of a holographic win in such a way as to
give the adopted paper testamentary completeness." Ibid. at 706, 546); cf. In re Loud's
Estate, 70 Cal. App. 2d 399, 161 P. 2d 49 (1945); 68 C.J., Wills § 583 (1934). But cf. In re
Miller's Estate, 128 Cal. App. 176, 17 P. 2d 181 (1932), wherein an instrument apparently
lacking testamentary intent is held to incorporate an instrument not properly executed. The
court however was careful to point out testatorhad said that" 'he had fixed things for Minnie'
coupled with the exhibition of the two documents to her, [which furnishes] ample evidence of a
testamentary intent." Ibid., at 183, 184. The fact the papers were found together might also
sustain them on the theory of integration. In re Merryfield's Estate, 167 Cal. 729, 141 Pac. 259
(1914). It has been cited as an integration case. Mechem, Integration of Holographic Wills,
12 N.C.L. Rev. 213, 221 (1934).
37 See cases cited in note 29 supra.
3s The logical extreme of this view has clearly been rejected. Thus, a will required to be
attested by two witnesses which is only attested by one is not validated by a codicil with only
one attesting witness. Consult cases cited in note 29 supra.
39 See discussion in note 35 supra.
0 The requirements for integration are stated in part II of this comment.
33

34
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insure that a testator would be clearly cognizant of the testamentary disposition
he was then making." 41 To allow an instrument properly executed but lacking
testamentary intent to incorporate a defective will by reference would seem to
overlook the desired coincidence of formal execution and testamentary intent.
In fact it is difficult to see how an instrument lacking testamentary intent can
be a testamentary instrument at all.
It would thus appear that the application of incorporation by reference in the
Johnson case is not only. supported by authority, but that cases denying the
validation of defective wills by subsequent holograph are distinguishable insofar
as they lack holographs that can be admitted to probate on their own terms,4
43
under what has been herein suggested as the better rule.
-

II

The generally recognized formal requisites for the integration of the writings
that are to be the "last will" of the testator, as have been developed in regard to
attested Wills, have been stated as follows:
Three criteria are commonly used by the courts in determining Whether or not inte:
gration is to be permitted. These are (1) lihysical'cbnnection, (2) internal sense con41
Scott v. Gastright, 305 Ky. 340, 343, 204 S.W. 2d 367, 368 (1947).
42
The test for independent probate herein envisioned is best illustrated by a,jurisdiction
which denies incorporation by reference. Thus, in In re Emmon's Will, 110 App. Div. 701,
96 N.Y. Supp. 506 (1st Dep't, 1906), a faultily attested will was followed by a properly executed codicil. The will was denied probate following New York authority which does not
recognize the doctrine of incorporation by reference of defectively executed wills. However,
the codicil was admitted to probate. "It was undoubtedly the intention of the testator that
this instrument should operate in connection with the will which he supposed he had executed,
and that it should be an addition thereto. That his intention failed in this respect, however,
does not defeat the instrument .... If the codicil be so complete in itself as to be capable of
execution, then it must necessarily stand and be given the force of a valid testamentary disposition." Ibid. at 704, 509. In re Steiner's Will, 142 N.Y. Misc. 710, 255 N.Y. Supp. 397
(Surr. Ct., 1932); cf. In re Pardy's Estate, 161 N.Y. Misc. 77, 291 N.Y. Supp. 969 (Surr. Ct.,
1936); In re Francis' Estate, 73 NY. Misc. 148, 132 N.Y. Supp. 695 (Surr. Ct., 1911) (leading
case). But see In re Ayres' Will, 43 N.E. 2d 918 (Ohio App., 1940).
The handwriting in Johnson v. Johnson (quoted at note 4 supra) when compared to the
test in In re Emmons' Will seems to be admissible to probate by itself. "The codicil in question,'
sp far as it goes, is entirely complete. The carrying out of its provisions in no sense depends
upon the will to which it attempts to refer. It simply carves out of the estate a legacy, and
bequeaths it to an individual capable of taking." In re Emmons' Will, supra, at 705, 509.
43Two general objections are commonlyraised when non-holographic material is sought to
be incorporated into holographic.
"If appellee's theory is sound, it would.authorize a person to validate a forty page printedz
or typewritten, instrument as a will by simply.writing at the end thereof, 'The above is my
will' and signing such statement." Scott v. Gastright, 305 Ky. 340, 343, 204 S.W. 2d 367, 368
(1947). It is submitted that probate in such a case would properly be refused, since the incorporating instrument is neither appointive nor dispositive, and is thus itself not admissible
to probate. Authority cited in note 35 supra.
. It is also argued that under the view herein asserted, a testator may validate material he
has never read. Scott v. Gastright, supra. This objection loses its force when it is seen that it
would equally apply to attested wills. Furthermore, it has been rejected in a case involving the
incorporation of the will of another into a holograph. Estate of Martin, 31 Cal. App. 2d 501,
88 P. 2d 234 (1939).
.
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niection, and (3) extrinsic evidence permitted to prove the existence at the time of
44
execution, usually in the absence of either physical or internal sense connection.
Application of these principles to Johnson v. Johnsons would seem to lead to the
conclusion that the paper therein was an integrated and continuous whole. The
fact that the writings involved were on the same page is sufficient physical connection.45 Similarly, the handwriting cannot be said to be so discontinuous with
the sense and meaning of the typewriting as to defeat integration, although it
does not appear to continue the exact thought of the last typewritten sentence. 46
And of course both writings were in existence and in the same room at the time
47
Mr. Johnson signed the handwriting.
Tests for the integration of unattested instruments, insofar as they differ
from those applying to attested papers, are rather ill-defined.4 s Perhaps it may
fairly be stated that separate unattested writings will be regarded as the will of
the testator when the court feels that he intended all such writings together to
constitute his will.

49

Turning again to Johnsonv. Johnson, the physical and possibly sense connections already discussed seem to give rise to the inference that the testator intended the entire paper to be one will. The reference in the handwriting to "this
44Integration, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 915, 917 (1952). Consult Atkinson, Wills § 79 (2d ed.,
1953).
"E.g., Hays v. Marschall, 243 Ky. 392, 48 S.W. 2d 540 (1932).
46The last typewritten sentence suggests the employment of a certain attorney, and ends
"but should they not agree then my said brother and sister shal employ whomsoever they may
desire, being coutious [sic] that nothing to be done without their consent and knowledge."
Okla., 279 P. 2d 928, 933 (1955). The handwriting is quoted in full in text at note 4 supra.
4
7"IT]hough it has been suggested that the imperativeness of having all pieces present at
the time of execution becomes moot [where formal aftestation is not required], the courts which
have dealt with the problem would make such presence a prerequisite to integration." Integration, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 915, 921 (1952).
48For a penetrating discussion see Mechem, Integration of Holographic Wils, 12 N.C.L.
Rev. 213, 220, 221 (1934). Consult Atkinson, Wils § 79 (2d ed., 1953).
41Where such intent was found: In re Moody's Estate, 118 Cal. App. 2d 300, 312, 257- P.
2d 709, 716 (1953) ("[Tlhey were obviously written for the single purpose of disposing of the
testator's estate"); In re Morrison's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 380,384, 220 P. 2d 413, 416 (1950)
("In the instant case, it is quite clear that the two writings were intended by the testator to be his will"); In re Dumas' Estate, 34 Cal. 2d 406, 414, 210 P. 2d 697, 702 (1949)
("Thus we clearly have an intent that all the papers were to be considered together as one
continuous and complete document"); In re Swendsen's Estate, 43 Cal. App. 2d 551, 555,
11 P. 2d 408, 410 (1941) ("The writings on the two papers unquestionably are complementary to each other and together they constitute a rounded out will").
Where such intent was not found: In re Paull's Estate, 208 Okla. 195, 197-198, 254 P. 2d
357,360 (1953) ("[Ilt must be apparent.., that the several sheets of paper should constitute
one single instrument and that it be effective as his last will and testament"); In re Wunderle's
Estate, 30 Cal. 2d 274, 284, 181 P. 2d 874, 880 (1947) ("[Tlhere is nothing in the record to
show that the testator intended that the letter and message be construed together as forming
his will"); In re Bauer's Estate, 51 Cal. Appr. 2d 636,638, 124 P. 2d 630,631 (1942) ("[T]here
is nothing in the three undated letters indicating that they were to be read or construed as
a part of decedent's holographic will").
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will" may also be regarded as expressing a similar intention. Furthermore; the
typewriting ended without punctuation and cases may be cited wherein the
absence of punctuation at the end of an instrument is held to give rise to the
inference that it is incomplete.61 The handwriting may therefore be viewed as
merely completing the typewriting.
Writings in cases similar to Johnson v. Johnson have been held integrated. In
In re Moody's Estate,6' the contest concerned a sheet of paper with handwriting

of decedent on both sides. At the top of the obverse side was the date November
21, 1951. The writing, containing various bequests, continued on the reverse
side until the middle of the page. Then follows a new date, December 3, 1951,
more handwriting, and the only signature contained on the paper.
It is reasonably clear that had he not intended the writing preceding the date December 3, 1951, to be a part of his will, he would not have written that date and the provisions immediately following it on the same sheet of paper. Both parts are wholly
testamentary in character; they are integrated by their context... they were obviously written for the single purpose of disposing of the testator's estate.'3
Thus it was held that the entire paper was to be admitted to probate as an
4
integrated whole.
It is thus submitted that the writings in Johnson v. Johnson are arguably not
"will and codicil," but constitute one integrated whole. As such they would be
inadmissible to probate, for it is clearly established that unattested integrated
writings must be entirely handwritten if they are to constitute a valid will.'6
III
In the law of wills, integration, as distinguished from incorporation by reference,
occurs when there is no reference to a distinctly extraneous document, but it is clear
that two or more separate writings are intended by the testator to be his will.... On
the other hand, there is incorporation by reference when one of the writings is a complete testamentary instrument, and refers to another document in a manner clearly
6
designated to accomplish that purpose.1
50 Under this interpretation, the phrase "this will" is a mere statement referring to the
entire paper as a single testamentary document.
11In re Devlin's Estate, 198 Cal. 721, 247 Pac. 577 (1926); In re Hurley's Estate, 178 Cal.
713, 174 Pac. 669 (1918); cf. In re Brook's Estate, 214 Cal. 138,4 P. 2d 148 (1931); In re England's Estate, 85 Cal. App. 486, 259 Pac. 956 (1927); In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239
Pac. 404 (1925).
52118 Cal. App. 2d 300, 257 P. 2d 709 (1953).
6 Ibid., at 312, 716.
54 Testator wrote a will and had another copy it. Below the copy he wrote "I have read the
above statement," and signed his name and date. Held: copy is not admissible to probate. In
re McNamara's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 182, 260 P. 2d 182 (1953). Also consult Gibson v.
Gibson, stated in note 3 supra.
51 Consult, for example, cases cited in notes 19-25 supra, which hold the effect of incorporation by reference to be merger, and thus deny the incorporation of non-holographic matter
by holographic.
56n re Wunderle's Estate, 30 Cal. 2d 274, 281, 181 P. 2d 874, 878 (1947). Also consult
authorities cited in note 1 supra.
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In Johnson v. Johnson, on one hand, it appears that "two or more separate
writings are intended by the testator to be his will." Yet "one of the writings is a
complete testamentary instrument and [may be taken to] refer to another document."

57

The phenomenon of integration and incorporation by reference both being
applicable to the same fact situation has received little judicial recognition.
Courts are prone in such circumstances to apply either doctrine--and do not
acknowledge that the one overlooked may also apply and possibly lead to an
opposite result.69 Moreover, one gathers from the case law that the doctrines are
mutually exclusive.60 In consequence, no express body of law has been developed
to cover a situation to which both doctrines may be applied.
The only explicit recognition and proposed solution of this problem yet found
is that in an article by Professor Phillip Mechem. 61 It is there argued that allowing a holograph to incorporate and thereby validate non-holographic material
is at variance with holding that integrated non-holographic material invalidates
the holograph. The variance is highlighted by a case 2 in which both theories
seem to apply with equal justification-and lead to different results (as in
Johnson v. Johnson). This dilemma is felt to "indicate that there is a fundamen-

tal error in attempting to apply the technique of incorporation to holographic
wills at all."6 In solution Professor Mechem suggests that the incorporation of
non-holographic material into holographic be refused. Or, alternatively, the
effect of incorporation by reference is to be the same as the effect of integration.6
7

The divergent interpretation of the phrase "this will" is basic to this dual application.
Compare discussion at note 12 supra with that in note 50 supra.
15The so-called "envelope cases," involving papers in themselves incomplete which are
found within envelopes on which the missing essentials have been written, furnish a prime
example of cases wherein incorporation and integration both seem to apply. Compare Alexander v. Johnston, 171 N.C. 468, 88 S.E. 785 (1916) (integration), with In re Goods of Aliminoso, 1 Swa. & Tr. 508 (Prob., 1859) (incorporation). See also In re Nicholls, [1921] 2
Ch. 11, cited by Atkinson as a proper case for either doctrine. Atkinson, Wills § 80 at note 4
(2d ed., 1953). Professor Mechem, op. cit. supra note 48, discusses these cases at page 229,
coming to the result herein expressed.
For other cases possibly illustrating the same problem consult In re McNamara's Estate at
note 54 supra; Gibson v. Gibson at note 33 supra; In re Moody's Estate at note 52 supra; In re
Miller's Estate at note 36 supra; Hurley v. Blankenship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W. 2d 963 (1950);
and In re Morrison's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 380, 220 P. 2d 413 (1950).
The significant feature about most cases wherein it would appear that integration and
incorporation may both be applied is that the subsequent writing is attested, or both writings
are holographic. Thus, application of either theory would lead to the same result. It is only
where the subsequent writing depends on its holographic character for validity and the prior
writing is non-holographic that the theories will lead to divergent results.
60 Consult authorities cited in note 1 supra.
I Mechem, Integration of Holographic Wills, 12 N.C.L. Rev. 213 (1934).
62 Gibson v. Gibson, 28 Grat. (Va.) 44 (1877), discussed in note 3 supra.
Mechem, op. cit. supra note 61, at 229.
"4Cases cited in notes 19-25 supra may be cited in support of this position.
3
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And thus it would follow that integration is to be preferred over incorporation
by reference in ai situation where both may be applied.
Application of this rule to Johnson v. Johnson would eliminate confusion as to
which doctrine to apply-both leading to the same negative result-althugh
the problem of whether to admit the handwriting alone might remain.6 Besides
this certainty of application, the logical difficulty of ascribing different effects to
similar doctrines vanishes. Some might also argue that the danger of fraud and
forgery is lessened with the requirement that only handwritten material can be
incorporated into handwritten material.6 6 Professor Mechem's solution would
also tend to promote doctrinal certainty insofar as it would eliminate the
variance in cases involving holographic incorporation and not integration, 67 although in a manner different from that suggested in Part I of this comment.
And thus it is said that this rule is "sound from the standpoint of analysis as well
as from the standpoint of providing a tolerable and working rule."6"
There are several considerations, however, which would point to an opposite
result. Given several writings-none of which individually meet the formal requirements of the local wills statute-their combination may in certain circuni
stances be admitted to probate under the doctrine of integration," if it be found
that these writings, in combination,were intended by the testator to constitute
7
his will," i.e., were intended to effectuate a disposition of his property at death. '
In the Johnson situation where integration and incorporation by reference both
Apply with only the latter resulting in validation, the use of integration, by emphasizing the "in combination" aspect of testator's intention, would operate to
defeat his intention to dispose of his estate at death. This use of integration
65Thls would depend on whether Professor Mechem's view categorically refuses to incorpo:
rate non-holographic material into holographic or whether it would allow such an incorporation, but'hold the effect thereof to be merger. Under the former rule, the majority in Johnson
might well admit the handwriting to probate by itself under the rule in In re Emmons' Will
discussed in note 42 supra. Possibly such a result may also be justified on the "surplusage"
theory of integration under which it is possible to ignore anything in an instrument that may
be left out without affecting the sense or completeness of the instrument. See In re Goodman's
Will, 229 N.C. 444, 50 S.E. 2d 34 (1948); Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S.E. 873 (1922);
Mechem, op. cit. supra note 61, at 214-19.
66 This argument was made in 8 Vand. L. Rev. 924,927 (1955), noting Johnson v. Johnson:
It is therein concluded that the decision is undesirable because "a way will be opened for fraud
in Oklahoma wills."
67 Consult cases cited in notes 16-25 supra.

Is Mechem, op. cit. supra note 61, at 230.
"1E.g., Estate of Skerrett, 67 Cal. 585, 8 Pac. 181 (1885). See also cases cited in note 49
supra.
70 See cases cited in note 49 supra.
71This seems in accord with the commonly accepted definition of a will. "A will is a person's
declaration of what is to be done after his death, which declaration is (1) revocable during
his lifetime, (2) operative for no purpose until his death, and (3) applicable to the situation
which exists at his death. Usually a will relates to the disposition of the maker's property."
Atkinson, Wills § 1 at p. 1 (2d ed., 1953).
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contrary to an intention which is basic to it and perhaps affords its principal
justification would seem questionable when the alternative theory of incorporation by reference may be utilized to carry out this intention.
The "surplusage" theory of integration 2 may perhaps afford technical support for this result. In the Johnson situation it is possible to argue that although
the handwriting was intended to be a part of the typewriting, the latter may be
ignored as "surplusage," leaving the handwriting to stand alone, since this would
not affect the sense or completeness of the handwriting itself.73 It would not
can incorporate the
seem unreasonable then to hold that the handwriting
"surplusage" typewriting, thereby validating it. 4
It would thus appear that giving preference to incorporation by reference
over integration where both may be applied is not only in harmony with the
integration theory, but that a technical means whereby this result may be
reached is readily available. Furthermore, this result is in accord with the policy
against intestacy expressed by many courts. 6 And if it be assumed, as submitted
in Part I of this comment, that incorporation by reference requires the existence
of an incorporating instrument which itself is admissible to probate, there seems
little reason to fear a way will be opened for fraud and forgery. The validity of
the incorporating instrument will act as a safeguard against such contingencies.
This view would support, and be supported by, the result reached in the principal case.
72

See, for a statement of the "surplusage" theory, note 65 supra.

73 E.g., In re Goodman's Will, 229 N.C. 444, 50 S.E. 2d 34 (1948), where decedent left a

valid typewritten will, on which were found certain handwritten interlineations. Below was an
additional handwritten paragraph, signed and dated. Held: The interlineations and the other
handwriting were a valid holographic codicil. The typewriting is ignored as surplusage, leaving
the handwriting to stand alone. Cf. In reAtkinson's Estate, 110 Cal. App. 499, 294 Pac. 425
(1930). As to the completeness of the handwriting itself in the Johnson case see discussion in
note 42 supra.
74 Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S.E. 873 (1922), is suggestive in this regard. There, the
prior non-holographic will of decedent was revoked by operation of law, Subsequent handwriting, altoumgh on a printed form, was held to revive the prior will, the handwriting being
"complete and entire in itself." Ibid., at 29, 876. If non-holographic material (printed form),
although intended as part of the handwriting, may be thus overlooked and the handwriting
have the effect of validating other non-holographic material (prior non-holgoraphic will), why
not allow the holograph to validate (i.e., incorporate) the overlooked or "surplusage" nonholographic material?
7- "The modem trend in states where holographic wills are recognized has been to be less
insistent on formalities because that insistence would be detrimental to the policy favoring
testamentary disposition of property," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 844, 845 (1950), noting In re Dumas?
Estate, 34 Cal. 2d 406,210 P. 2d 697 (1949). The Oklahoma courts have gone very far in this
regard. See Iii re Hail's Estate, 106 Okla. 124,235 Pac. 916 (1923). There appears to be a tendency to apply statutes generally considered to involve the construction of wills to the execution of wills. See, for a criticism of this position, Montague v. Street, 59 N.D. 618, 231 N.W,
728 (1930). Corn, J., concurring specially in the Johnson case seems to use this approach.

